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Kaplan (2009) is back and this time with a new, mesmerizing idea: ‘it’s geography, 
baby’. According to the illustrious foreign correspondent of The Atlantic, we should not 
look too far away to explain the complexity of present world politics. The answer lies just 
there, under our feet. It is in fact geography which largely determines world political 
events. To be deaf to its insights would lead us (i.e., America and the West) to follow our 
idea(l)s in a reckless way. The analogy with the ‘Big Mac’ is clear. Like the ‘airy cherub’ 
of Mackinder at Versailles in 1919, Kaplan’s whispered message reads today all the 
same: don’t let your idealistic aspirations for democracy and freedom take over the 
‘reality’ of geography. The price to pay, in flesh and blood, would be too high - Iraq 
stands as an example. 
Kaplan’s argument is pretty straightforward. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, which triggered euphoric feelings for a new dawn of global peace, we are back to 
business as usual. It is once again realism which can guide us in this precarious world. 
Freedom and democracy means nothing if order is not in place (p. 98). Brushing the dust 
off from Malthus, Mahan, Mackinder, and Spykman - and, more surprisingly, also from 
Braudel and Canetti (who I am not sure would be happy to be put in such a coterie) – 
Kaplan presents us with a classic geopolitical landscape. Eurasia is at the center, as 
usually. Yet, what Kaplan’s call Eurasia is actually Mackinder’s inner crescent (or 
Spykman’s rimland). Very little of Central Asia and Russia is, in fact, in the picture. All 
attention goes to the usual suspects – those states from the Mediterranean’s eastern shores 
to the Indian subcontinent, which form the notorious ‘arc of crisis’ of US realism. These 
are the trouble-makers, the source of chaos which threats the world… well, the Western 
world, as in fact Kaplan seems not very much concerned with, for instance, Africa or 
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South America. Whichever troubles are here, they would not bother the West and its 
security. Driven by a ‘healthy’ realist perspective, Kaplan in fact cares only about his 
world (USA and the West). The sufferance caused by the instability within the ‘arc of 
crisis’ is not, per se, a matter of concern. What matters, instead, is how the instability and 
the potential geopolitical change within this region might threaten ‘us’, both by 
disrupting our socio-economic life and by challenging – China and India, more than 
Russia – the primacy of the West(ern empire). 
As a way to understand and predict these threats, Kaplan turns to geography. 
Contrary to academic geographers, for whom geography is about the complexity of 
interrelated human and non-humans factors, Kaplan’s idea of geography echoes the one 
which many of us might have heard the time we have dared mentioning to someone our 
profession: ‘ah, you study rivers, capitals and things like that’... Kaplan’s geography 
resonates with the same basic elements of our old, idiographic discipline. In his own 
words: “The physical features of the landscape may be the only reliable guides left to 
understanding the shape of future conflict” (p. 102).  
Even if he does not mention his name, Kaplan’s conceptual model reproduces 
Cohen’s (1964) idea of shatter-belts. Kaplan’s “geographic logic”, in fact, which can give 
us precious “insights” to decipher world politics, relies on the idea that “like rifts in the 
Earth’s crust that produce physical instability”, there are areas in the world which “are 
more prone to conflicts than others” (p. 102). Nothing new, as said, since the same idea 
was put forward by Cohen almost half-century ago. Yet, rather surprisingly, Kaplan’s 
rifts are all localized within a rather narrow strip, namely Eurasia (i.e., the rimland). 
These rifts – left undiscussed by Kaplan – determine four ‘shatter zones’: the Indian 
subcontinent, the Arabian Peninsula, the Fertile Crescent, and the Persian core. These are 
areas which “threaten to implode, explode, or maintain a fragile equilibrium” and which, 
rather evocatively, Kaplan labels “the greater Middle East”. The use of this term is not 
accidental, as it obviously aims to extend the idea of instability, often associated with the 
Middle East, to the whole strip.  
Kaplan’s geopolitical view relies essentially on “rivers, deserts, mountains, and other 
enduring facts of geography” to determine whether a state’s boundaries are “artificial” or 
not and, therefore, whether a state is “illogical” (i.e, against geography, that is to say 
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nature) or not. Accordingly, since the landscape between India and Bangladesh is the 
same on both sides of the border, it is hard for Kaplan not to predict some geopolitical 
“metamorphose” in this region. ‘Tell me your borders and I will tell your fate’ – a pretty 
scary scenario if we consider how many states, even in the West, have “artificial” 
boundaries. 
Kaplan’s piece offers geographers with a rich terrain for criticism. Feminist authors 
might stress his masculine gaze, which sees the threat haunted among crowds of young 
men in overcrowded peripheries. They might also lament the lack of human agency, and 
therefore the absence of any political accountability and responsibility. Similarly, critical 
geopolitics’ authors might discard Kaplan’s geographical determinism for its blindness to 
what make geography intelligible, i.e. language and discourse. Additionally, they could 
criticize his Western-centric, state-centric, and conflict-driven view. Classic geopolitics’ 
students might instead conclude that, despite Kaplan’s goal “to revise Mackinder for our 
time” (p. 100), particularly by stressing the connectivity between the heartland and the 
rimland, his analysis does not present any new, original insight. Moreover, they could 
also question his inconsistency in contrasting geography and ideas, when he actually 
seems to value both. Or, again, they could ask why Korea – one of the most debated 
‘shatter zone’ of our time - is not in the picture. 
My aim, however, is not to simply offer a critical reading of the latest geopolitical 
discourse available on the market. Although I believe that it is always important to 
confront this type of universalistic/deterministic certitudes with a critical spirit, I also 
believe that the role of political geographers should not confine itself within a mere de-
constructivist move. Nobody doubts, I think, that political geographers know well how to 
critically engage geopolitical representations. Past critiques of Kaplan (Dalby, 1996; 
Dalby, 2007), as well as Barnett (Roberts et al., 2003) and Friedman (Sparke, 
forthcoming) – not to mention the long list of critiques of Fukuyama, Ohmae, and 
Huntington – stand as good examples. Yet, the risk is that academic geographers might 
content themselves with a role of critics of others’ geopolitical representations rather than 
proposing concrete alternative ways to deal with the here and now of geopolitical 
problems. For Blomley (2006), the job of critical geographers has indeed become “a little 
too easy”. The usual ‘formula’ is one of first showing a righteous wrath at oppressive 
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power relations, then moving to their meticulous critique, and finally concluding by “a 
pious appeal to progressive/emancipatory/liberatory alternatives, without specifying these 
in detail” (ibid.: 88). 
In its simplified argument, The Revenge of Geography puts political geographers in 
front of a challenging question: what do we know better and how can we make our more 
informed geographical knowledge count in policy-making decisions? Since the discursive 
turn, the focus in political geography has increasingly switched from studies aimed at 
‘analyzing’ reality (O' Loughlin and van der Wusten, 1987) to studies aimed at 
‘problematizing’ it (Ó Tuathail, 1987). Moreover, political geographers have increasingly 
avoided dealing with politics with the big ‘P’ (i.e., the state) to privilege instead the little 
‘p’ of everyday life, social movements, local actors, etc. (Flint, 2003; Low, 2003). While 
all this has enriched our discipline and our critical understanding of the world, it has also 
generated a void of knowledge, which comes then to be filled by people like Kaplan and 
their ‘one size fits all’ recipes.  
I certainly agree with Toal (2003: 655) that we should contribute to “a public political 
culture that demands, requires and values grounded geographical knowledge over 
abstract geopolitical sloganizing”. Yet, we should also not forget that people like Kaplan 
knows the world by foot more than many among us. A public political culture, ‘thick’ 
with geographical knowledge, might therefore not always be enough. An alternative 
which political geographers should then consider is to engage directly with the big ‘P’. 
As put by a political geographer who has to confront daily with the harshness of the ‘real 
world’ (Newman 2004), this alternative means to find the ways to bridge the gap between 
‘us’ (academic geographers) and ‘them’ (statesmen, diplomats, etc.).1 “If we believe that 
we understand the complex processes of structural change which are taking place in 
global relations, we should not shy away from taking a proactive stance on a range of 
geopolitical issues […]” (ibid.: 630). This, I would argue, would be the ‘revenge’ of 
political geographers. To be able to talk to the big ‘P’, without feeling sinful (Agnew 
2004: 635) or ambitious (Mamadouh and Dijkink, 2006: 354).  
                                                 
1 Interestingly, as a way to bridge this gap, Foreign Policy will soon host the replies of some political 
geographers to Kaplan’s article. 
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To be true, as O’Loughlin ( 2000) observes, it might be hard to make a ‘thick’ 
geographical knowledge work in a world where order and regularity are usually wanted. 
Yet, this should not refrain us to reflect on the value added of our knowledge (Agnew, 
2003: 606; Bassin, 2004: 626) and on how we can make this world a better place. As 
Newman (2004: 630) argues, “it is time to show that our geopolitics can extend beyond 
the realms of the ivory tower and even make an impact where it counts”. Without 
abandoning the work on and with the little ‘p’, political geographers should explore the 
ways in which the big ‘P’ might become an interlocutor in a conversation which goes 
beyond the logic of realism and exclusive national interests. In an epoch of ‘yes, we can’ 
maybe this is an alternative worth exploring, if we don’t want to limit ourselves 
‘teaching’ Thomas (Friedman or Barnett), but not the big ‘P’ who listened to them (and 
not to us). This can be terrain for the ‘revenge’ of political geographers. 
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